The long-standing problem of quantum information processing is to remove the classical channel from quantum communication. Introducing a new information processing technique, it is discussed that both insecure and secure quantum communications are possible without the requirement of classical channel.
Quantum cryptography [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] and teleportation [8] are the two important aspects of quantum communication. Wiesner [1] first realized that quantum state can be used to store data to ensure its security. Apart from security reason, the idea of using quantum state for information processing was new and it laid the foundation of modern quantum information. Bennett and Brassard, in their quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol [2] , pointed out the same idea can also be applied for the security of transmitted data. At present many QKD protocols exist [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . All these schemes need a quantum and an auxilary classical channel. On the other hand, in teleportation, quantum state can be perfectly sent to a distant location without physically sending the state at all. Here again, deterministic classical channel is used to teleport the quantum state. In general, the presence of classical channel in quantum communication protocols -such as dense coding [9] , entanglement purification [10] etc -is a long-standing problem. In their famous teleportation paper, Bennett et al argued removal of classical channel from quantum communication needs superluminal signal. In their argument they followed the standard technique of information processing. Perhaps, because of this argument, it is widely believed such removal is impossible although the possibility of complete quantum communication is not directly ruled out by that argument.
Presenting an alternative information processing technique, we shall see that this belief is misplaced and the power of quantum mechanics in quantum information processing is underestimated. If secure communication through completely quantum channel is possible then insecure communication will, needless to say, also be possible. Due to this reason, we shall focus on secure communication and present an alternative QKD technique which can act as quantum authentication technique. Interestingly even classical channel and classical authentication technique [11] can not be used in our QKD protocol when bit by bit security is ensured. In contrast, existing QKD protocols have to depend on classical authentication because no quantum authentication scheme exists. By quantum authentication we mean which does not use classical channel for authentication.
The basic idea behind our approach is to produce arbitrarily long sequence of bits randomly choosing the two comparatively short sequences of quantum states, representing logical 0 and 1. Information of the two short sequences is shared between receiver and sender.
As for examples let us take the following two sequences of quantum states.
where S 0 and S 1 stand for bit 0 and 1 respectively and n is the total number of states in a sequence. Information of these two sequences S 0 and S 1 are shared between sender Alice, and receiver Bob. The key, the sequence of sequences of quantum states, is,
where N is the number of bits in the key. Obviously, N ¿ 2n since 2n bits (standard meaning) are shared.
Following the above coding technique, we shall now present a QKD protocol, where the two sequences will be prepared by two different pairs of nonorthogonal states and the density matrices of the two sequences are same i.e. ρ 0 = ρ 1 . This protocol can be used both for two-party and multi-party [12, 13] secure communications.
Firstly, we describe the preparation procedure of the two sequences. Suppose, in a secret place, Alice and Bob are given 2n horizontally polarized (|↔ ) incoherent photons. To prepare a sequence they use n photons (n is a moderately large number). To produce S 0 , they split the wave function of each of the n photons with a symmetric (50:50) beam splitter. Now they do one of the two things in the path s : toss a coin, and if the result is "head", unitarily rotates the polarization by 90
• (|↔ s −→ | s ) and if "tail" they do nothing (|↔ s −→ |↔ s ). In the other path, called r, they do nothing (|↔ r −→ |↔ r ). The states are :
To produce S 1 , similarly after splitting the state of each of the remaining n photons, they do one of the two things in the path s : toss a coin; if "heads", unitarily rotates by 45 • (|↔ s −→ |ր ւ s ) and if "tail", unitarily rotates by 135
• (|↔ s −→ |տ ց s ). Similarly in the other path r, they do nothing. The states are :
These states can be represented by the following base states:
In this basis, the density matrix of the two sequences is,
Now they are separated. Let us think that Alice transmits a single bit, either S 0 or S 1 . Bob's task is to recover the bit. One may think as density matrices are same how Bob would recover it. Bob can independently and statistically recover the bit value in different ways since he knows the preparation code of the both types of possible bits, however their density matrices are same. Whatever be the identification processes, Bob's objective is to recover the bit value from the shared information. In this protocol, we shall use conclusive which path information to identify the individual quantum state. But mere W P information is not enough to identify the state. Bob needs which-path of which-state (W P W S) information to identify the individual state. But, to recover the bit value which-path of which-state (W P W S) information is also not enough , he needs which-path of which-state of which density matrices (WPWSWD) information. Next we shall see how to get WPWSWD information to recover the bit value.
In this method, Bob uses two sets of dual analyzers (DA) on the two resulting paths. Suppose the orientations of DA are : i)
√ " and " × " stand for " yes" and " no" results respectively. The probabilities of these three kinds of results for the four different superposition states are given in table 1 and 2 considering the statistical weight of the states and orientations of the dual analyzers. The results α and β provide which-path (W P ) information and the result γ gives no-path (NP )information. The result α does not give any W P W S information for any of the above two settings of DA. The NP information corresponding to the result γ is always inconclusive for any settings of the DA. The only result β provides conclusive W P W S information for proper choice of above two settings of DA. The W P W S information conclusively determines the state |A i for DA 0 and the state |C i for DA 1 .
As Bob does not know the bit value in advance, he uses two sets of DAs. The measurements yield two sets of random results. Firstly, Bob discards inconclusive results from both the sets. For clarity let us assume states |A i are at even positions and the states |C i are at odd positions of sequence S 0 and S 1 respectively. Suppose the reduced sequences of results corresponding to two DAs are, 
in the two sequences as described. They are randomly distributed. Yet the technique of recovery of bit value is same. Bob first discards the states corresponding to the discarded events from both of the shared sequences. Now with these two reduced sequences of results (P n/8 and Q n/8 ) and two reduced sequences of states (S n/8 0 and S n/8 1 ), he performs four correlation tests to identify the bit. Out of these tests, only one of the reduced sequences of results would be totally correlated (assuming noise is not present) with one of the reduced sequences of states. Recovery of the bit value means recovery of WPWSWD information.
The first bit is completely secure due to the indistinguishability principle of differently prepared same density matrices. But they have to create large number of bits (at least more than the shared data). So they have to use the same two sequences again and again. But repetitive use means eavesdropper's gain of information. Therefore, Eve, the eavesdropper, intercepting all the sequences of an arbitrarily long key, can get full information of the two sequences correlating the results of randomly coming sequences and send the cloned key to Bob. Of course, full information of the two sequences are not required, Eve can decipher the key by using marginal statistics. In favor of eavesdropping, it is assumed that Eve somehow manages to compensate the long time delay caused by her measurements. At this point, it seems that the advantage of un-certainty principle (measurement creates unavoidable disturbances) is lost. In the next sections, we shall discuss that the advantage of uncertainty principle can be restored by simple strategy.
To exploit uncertainty principle, Alice will not send next sequence, until she is confirmed by Bob that the received sequence was uncorrupted. If Eve intercepts a sequence fully or partially, she is bound to introduce error when she will resend the sequence to Bob. But the question is how Bob will inform. If he uses authenticated classical channel, some additional shared secret bits will be needed to authenticate Bob's classical information. It means that security of created bits can be ensured if more data than created data can be shared. This is unrealistic. It implies, in this security criterion, classical channel and classical authentication technique can not be used. A new kind of authentication is required. For authentication following feedback technique can be taken. If bits are successfully received by Bob, he can send them back to Alice using the same two shared sequences. Alice, following similar measurements, can know that bit has reached to Bob. If Eve intercepts, she will introduce error when she resends the sequence to Bob. In that case, Bob can send totally depolarized photons to make Alice aware about interception. But Eve may not intercept sequence transmitted by Alice, she can only intercept Bob's generated sequence in the feedback phase. Then also sequence will be corrupted. For both situations, Alice will stop transmission. Here, single bit interception will be considered as total jamming of the channel that Eve can always do for all sorts of communications. Thus bit by bit security can be achieved by quantum authentication.
Secure message distribution. Secret message distribution is one of the important tasks of cryptography. The purpose is to distribute a key securely to two (or many) receivers to make them mutually dependent on each other to access the full information.
Existing quantum cryptographic procedure, can accomplish this task [12, 13] . Our protocol can be extended to perform this task.
Suppose in the previous scheme, there are two receivers, Bob and Sonu, in the two resulting paths, where Bob is on the path r and Sonu on the path s and both of them share information of the two sequences with Alice. Notice that, only s is the bit-carrying path. So Sonu independently can identify the bit values. That is, she can have WPWSWD information using single analyzer with proper orientation. But Bob can not. Bob always gets the same truncated state |↔ r which never carries any bit value. To give equal opportunity to Bob, Alice can make the path r as bit-carrying path. The states are:
For sake of Bob, Alice can prepare bits/sequences (Bob shares the preparation procedures) with these new superposition states. Due to this action, both of them are in similar position. Now if Alice randomly selects paths to encode the sequences, both of them will get 50% bits. So they have to co-operate to access the full key.
Splitting the state vector into many paths and making every path as bit-carrying path at random, the protocol can be extended to distribute information among many users. As for example, the states can be split up into three parts r, s and t for three receivers as follows,
The same density matrices of the sequence of states |A i and |B i (1:1) and the sequence of states |C i and |D i (1:1) in the representation R corresponding to the base states: 
Here bit-carrying path is t, so only receiver on path t will get the bit. If Alice randomly changes the bit-carrying path giving equal importance to each path, then each of the three receivers will get 33.33% bits of the key. Of course, they will have to go through the previously discussed two-way communication for quantum authentication (QA). Bob or Sonu -who will get the bit it is his/her duty to pursue QA.
In all the above protocols, states are mutually non orthogonal and density matrices of the two sequences are same. The mutual nonorthogonality and equivalence of density matrices are the most powerful combinations for this alternative quantum key distribution based on disentangled state. Suppose the two sequences, having same density matrices, are prepared by two different orthogonal states. In this protocol, intercepting a single sequence, Eve will not get the bit value but may evade detection (i.e. if she fortunately chooses the correct orthogonal basis). On the other hand, if density matrices are not same but states of each of the two sequences are non orthogonal then Eve can get the bit value from the single sequence but can not evade detection. If two criteria are imposed i.e. density matrices are same and states are non orthogonal for both sequences, then Eve will not get the bit value still she will introduce error. The system is extremely sensitive. In contrast, in the existing QKD protocols eavesdropping is detected only after leakage of some of the bit values.
In conclusion, it may not be inappropriate to say the protocol is truly QKD/QA protocol. Theoretical, and conceptual aspects of this alternative quantum information processing deserve further investigation.
Note added: Noise is a threat to security of all kind of QKD protocols. To avoid this problem, author has also developed a simple classical cipher system [14] . But quantum cryptography will remain very much alive due to other reasons. 
